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Digest:  People v. Ramirez  
Darrell J. Greenwald  
Opinion by Corrigan, J., expressing the unanimous view of 
the court. 
Issue 
Is the crime of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm under 
section 246.3(a) of the California Penal Code1 a necessarily 
lesser-included offense of the crime of discharge of a firearm at 
an inhabited dwelling under section 246 of the California Penal 
Code?2 
Facts 
Police responded to an apartment where a man was 
reportedly holding a gun to a woman’s head.3  When ordered 
outside by the police, Defendant, Jessie Jose Ramirez, fired 
several shots from a shotgun out of the front and rear windows of 
the apartment.4  In all, ten spent shells were found in 
 1 In full, section 246.3(a) reads: 
Except as otherwise authorized by law, any person who willfully discharges a 
firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could result in injury or death to a 
person is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in a 
county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 246.3(a) (West 2009). 
 2 In full, section 246 reads:  
Any person who shall maliciously and willfully discharge a firearm at an 
inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, occupied motor vehicle, occupied 
aircraft, inhabited housecar, as defined in Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, or 
inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243 of the vehicle Code, is guilty of a 
felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for three, five, or seven years, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a 
term of not less than six months and not exceeding one year.  [¶] As used in 
this section, ‘inhabited’ means currently being used for dwelling purposes, 
whether occupied or not. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 246 (West 2009). 
 3 People v. Ramirez, 201 P.3d 466, 467 (Cal. 2009). 
 4 Id. at 467–68.  After police identified themselves, knocked on the door and ordered 
the occupants out, a shotgun was fired through the window knocking one officer 
backwards and spraying him with glass. Id. at 467.  Once the officers took cover, several 
more shots were fired through the window, as well as from a rear window.  Police again 
ordered the occupants out of the apartment. Id.  The defendant’s wife, Samantha, and 
their five-year-old daughter, came out first. Id. at 467–68.  As Samantha emerged, she 
told officers that the defendant had put down his gun. Id. at 468.  Then the defendant, 
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Defendant’s apartment.5  Although no one was struck by any of 
the rounds fired by Defendant, several of the shots struck three 
neighboring apartments.6 
Defendant was convicted, inter alia, of “ten counts of grossly 
negligent shooting and three counts of shooting at an inhabited 
dwelling.”7  He was sentenced to fifteen years to life, plus thirty 
years and four months.8  On appeal, Defendant argued that three 
of the grossly negligent shooting convictions must be reversed 
because that crime is a necessarily lesser-included offense of 
shooting at an inhabited dwelling.9  The Court of Appeal affirmed 
Defendant’s convictions.10  The Supreme Court of California 
granted Defendant’s appeal from the appellate court’s decision.11 
Analysis 
As a preliminary matter, the parties agreed that three of the 
grossly negligent shooting counts and the three counts of 
shooting at an inhabited dwelling were based on the same acts.12  
Then the Court observed that under section 954 of the California 
Penal Code, “a single act or course of conduct can lead to 
convictions ‘of any number of the offenses charged,’”13 but added 
that a judicially created exception to section 954 prohibits 
multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.14 
The court identified “two tests for determining whether one 
offense is necessarily included in another: the ‘elements’ test and 
the ‘accusatory pleading test,’”15 but noted that only the statutory 
elements test was proper for “deciding whether a defendant may 
be convicted of multiple charged crimes.”16  The court settled on 
the “elements” test for deciding the case at bar because, here, the 
Jessie Jose Ramirez, came out of the apartment with his hands up. Id.  As the defendant 
exited he told the officers, “I’m your man, the gun’s on the couch.” Id. 
 5 Id. at 468. 
 6 Id.  One of the shotgun slugs fired pierced three walls of another apartment and 
was directed at a bedroom where an eight-month-old baby was sleeping. Id.  Another slug 
broke the window to a different apartment, hit the living room wall, and caused minor 
injuries to the occupant. Id. 
 7 Id.  The defendant was also convicted of the attempted deliberate and 
premeditated murder of a police officer, assault with a firearm upon a police officer, being 
a felon in possession of a firearm, and child endangerment. Id. at 468 n.4. 
 8 Ramirez, at 468. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 954). 
 14 Id. at 468 (referencing People v. Ortega, 968 P.2d 48 (Cal. 1998) and People v. 
Pearson, 721 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1986)). 
 15 Id. (referencing People v. Lopez, 965 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1998)). 
 16 Id. (citing People v. Reed, 137 P.3d 184 (Cal. 2006)). 
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case involved “the conviction of multiple alternative charged 
offenses.”17 
The court observed that the “elements” test looks strictly to 
the statutory elements, not to the specific facts of a given case.18  
The test is “whether all the statutory elements of the lesser 
offense are included within those of the greater offense . . . if a 
crime cannot be committed without also committing a lesser 
offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense.”19  On this 
basis, Defendant argued that “the crime of shooting at an 
inhabited dwelling (§ 246) cannot be committed without also 
committing a grossly negligent shooting (§ 246(a)).”20  The 
Attorney General countered that unlike section 246, the 
language section 246.3(a) requires “the actual presence of a 
person in harm’s way.”21 
Applying the “elements” test to the case at bar, the court 
found that section 246 requires the following elements: “(1) 
acting willfully and maliciously, and (2) shooting at an inhabited 
house.”22  Next, it recognized that section 246.3(a) requires the 
following elements: “(1) the defendant unlawfully discharged a 
firearm; (2) the defendant did so intentionally; (3) the defendant 
did so in a grossly negligent manner which could result in the 
injury or death of a person.”23 
First, the court dismissed the Attorney General’s argument, 
reasoning that the plain language and legislative history of the 
statute confirm that section 246.3(a) requires the likely presence 
of people in the area and not “that an actual person be in 
proximity to the grossly negligent shooting.”24  Second, the Court 
compared the elements of both offenses and found that 
“[a]lthough the mens rea requirements are somewhat differently 
described, both are general intent crimes” and both offenses 
“require that the defendant willfully fire a gun.”25  The court also 
reasoned that the offense of shooting at an inhabited building 
under section 246 is “grossly negligent because a significant risk 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 469. 
 21 Id.  In support of his argument, the Attorney General pointed to the following 
italicized language in section 246.3(a): “Except as otherwise authorized by law, any 
person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could 
result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a public offense . . . .” Id. (citing CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 246.3(a)(italics added)). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 469–72. 
 25 Id. at 472. 
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of injury or death is foreseeable.”26  It then declared that “the 
high probability of human death or personal injury in section 246 
is similar to, although greater than, the formulation of likelihood 
in section 246.3(a), which requires that injury or death ‘could 
result.’”27  Finally, the court found that the only “difference 
between the two, and the basis for the more serious treatment of 
a section 246 offense, is that the greater offense requires that an 
inhabited dwelling or other specified object be within the 
defendant’s firing range.”28  Thus, the court concluded that all 
the elements of section 246.3(a) are necessarily included in the 
more stringent requirements of section 246.29  Accordingly, the 
court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remanded with directions to reverse three of the grossly 
negligent shooting counts against Defendant.30 
Holding 
The court held that grossly negligent discharge of a firearm 
under section 246.3(a) of the California Penal Code is a 
necessarily lesser-included offense of discharge of a firearm at an 
inhabited dwelling under section 246 of the California Penal 
Code.31 
Legal Significance 
As a result of this case, a defendant may not be convicted 
under both section 246 and section 246.3(a) of the California 
Penal Code if both charges are based on the same act(s) of the 
defendant because the latter is a necessarily lesser-included 
offense of the former. 
 26 Id. at 469. 
 27 Id. at 472. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
